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Abstract
This paper analyses the necessary and sucient conditions to ensure that interest
rate policy does not introduce real indeterminacy and thus self-fullling uctuations
into open economies. A key feature of the model is the incorporation of capital
and investment spending into the analysis. The conditions for real determinacy
are examined for two measures of ination that central banks' can target in open
economies: domestic vs. consumer price ination. In stark contrast to previous
studies, in the presence of investment activity monetary policy that targets domestic
price ination is more susceptible to self-fullling uctuations than monetary policy
rules that target consumer price ination. However, the problem of indeterminacy
identied under domestic price ination can be ameliorated provided the policy rule
also responds to either the exchange rate or to output.
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11 Introduction
There is a growing body of research that considers the issue of local equilibrium deter-
minacy for the design of interest rate rules in sticky-price, open economy models.1 A
general conclusion to emerge from this literature is that the conditions for equilibrium
determinacy crucially depend on the degree of openness to international trade, provided
the policy rule is forward-looking. Consequently, the necessary and sucient condition to
ensure equilibrium determinacy for a closed economy, the so-called `Taylor Principle' (i.e.
an active policy stance), may no longer be appropriate for open economies.2 In particular,
one issue that has received increasing attention relates to whether the interest rate rule
should target domestic or consumer price ination.3 The general consensus within the
literature being that domestic price ination targeting is preferable to consumer price
ination targeting under forward-looking interest rate rules, whereas under contempora-
neous rules, the indicator of ination targeted is irrelevant for equilibrium determinacy
(e.g. Linnemann and Schabert, 2006; Llosa and Tuesta, 2008).
The above analyses are based on a framework where labour is the only factor of
production. However, since Dupor (2001) a number of recent closed economy studies
have shown that the conditions for equilibrium determinacy change signicantly once
the economic environment allows for capital and investment spending. For example,
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) show that in the presence of investment spending equilibrium
`determinacy is essentially impossible' under a forward-looking interest rate rule.4 For
current-looking interest rate rules, Carlstom and Fuerst (2005), Sveen and Weinke (2005),
and Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) all nd that the Taylor Principle is not a sucient
condition for determinacy, although the range of indeterminacy generated is typically
small.5
1For example, Zanna (2003), Batini et al. (2004), De Fiore and Liu (2005), Linnemann and Schabert
(2006), Llosa and Tuesta (2008), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2009), and Bullard and Schaling (2009).
2The Taylor Principle is a policy that raises the nominal interest rate by proportionately more than the
increase in ination. For its derivation in sticky-price, closed economy models, see for example, Kerr and
King (1996), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), and Clarida et al. (2000).
3Following Carlstrom et al. (2006) we interpret `targeting' as `reacting to'.
4Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008) show that the range of determinacy can be signicantly increased
if the monetary authority implements an interest rate policy that responds to both expected ination
and current output. However, this outcome requires an innite elasticity of labour supply. As shown by
Huang et al. (2009), with a nite, empirically plausible labour supply elasticity, a policy that responds
to both expected ination and current output helps little in ensuring determinacy.
5Sveen and Weinke (2005) show that the range of indeterminacy is higher if rm-specic capital is assumed,
relative to the more common assumption of a competitive rental market for capital. Benhabib and Eusepi
2The current paper attempts to ll this gap by deriving the conditions for local equi-
librium determinacy for economies that are open to international trade. Using a discrete-
time, money-in-the-utility function framework, this paper develops a two country, sticky-
price model that incorporates capital and investment spending.6 Financial markets are
assumed to be complete in the sense that agents in both countries have access to a com-
plete set of contingent claims. Price stickiness is introduced following Calvo (1983). The
degree of trade openness between the two countries is proxied by the degree of domestic
bias in the consumption bundle for traded goods. Monetary policy is initially charac-
terized by an interest rate rule that reacts solely to contemporaneous ination, where
there are two alternative price indexes the policy rule can target: domestic price ination
or consumer price ination.7 The Aoki (1981) decomposition approach is employed to
analyse the determinacy properties of the model. The Aoki decomposition decomposes
the open economy into two decoupled dynamic systems: the aggregate system that cap-
tures the properties of the closed world economy and the dierence system that portrays
the open economy dimension.
This paper shows that in the presence of investment spending, policies consistent with
equilibrium determinacy for closed economies may not preclude indeterminacy in open
economies. Moreover, the conditions for local determinacy under domestic and consumer
price ination are no longer equivalent in the presence of investment activity. Therefore
it matters for equilibrium determinacy whether domestic or consumer price ination is
targeted. It is shown that targeting consumer price ination is preferable to domestic
price ination targeting in order to avoid indeterminacy of equilibrium. Therefore, in
contrast to the existing literature, this is one example where reacting to consumer price
ination might be important.
The intuition behind these results rests with how the degree of trade openness exacer-
bates the cost-channel of monetary policy which arises in sticky-price models with capital.
(2005) show that the range of parameter values that guarantee local determinacy do not necessarily
guarantee global determinacy.
6The majority of the literature considers the issue of equilibrium determinacy using a small open economy
framework, where the foreign sector is exogenously given. Similar to Batini et al. (2004) and Bullard and
Schaling (2009), this paper instead utilizes a two country framework, where the optimizing decisions of
one country can aect prices and allocations in the other country.
7Recall that in a closed economy, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) observe that determinacy is almost impos-
sible under a forward-looking ination rule. In McKnight (2007b), an extended working paper version of
this paper, it is shown that for both ination indicators determinacy is even less than almost impossible
in the case of the open economy.
3As discussed by Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008) for a closed economy, under an
active policy an increase in the real interest rate puts upward pressure on the expected
future rental price of capital, which raises expected marginal cost. Consequently, indeter-
minacy can arise if the upward pressure on ination generated through this cost channel
outweighs the downward pressure on ination generated through the standard aggregate
demand channel of monetary policy. Allowing for trade openness exacerbates the upward
pressure on expected marginal cost, since an increase in expected future ination generates
a current deterioration in the terms of trade and thus upward pressure on real marginal
cost and current ination. Consequently, in the open economy it is more likely that this
cost channel can dominate the demand channel making a rise in domestic price ination
self-fullling. In contrast, since consumer price ination depends on both domestic price
ination and the terms of trade, the upward pressure exerted on the latter by this cost
channel of monetary policy can be more than oset by the downward pressure exerted
on the terms of trade through the trade channel of monetary policy, thereby exerting
downward pressure on the CPI ination rate. This makes indeterminacy less likely if the
policy rule reacts to consumer price ination.
The contribution of this paper is to yield new insights into what indicator of ination
central banks should target in open economies. In this analysis we nd that targeting
consumer price ination is preferable to domestic price ination targeting in preventing
self-fullling expectations. This is in stark contrast to the existing literature where the
measure of ination targeted is either deemed irrelevant for local determinacy under con-
temporaneous policy rules,8 or domestic price ination targeting is considered preferable
to consumer price ination under forward-looking policy rule specications.9 While this
analysis gives one example where reacting to consumer price ination can be deemed
preferable to domestic price ination, there are other factors other than the equilibrium
determinacy criterion that inuence the specication of the policy rule. For example,
Clarida et al. (2002) show that for open economies the optimal monetary policy is to tar-
get domestic price ination. Hence we outline alternative contemporaneous policy rules
8Linnemann and Schabert (2006) and Llosa and Tuesta (2008), both support Carlstrom et al. (2006)
closed economy ndings that the criteria for equilibrium determinacy does not imply a preference to any
particular ination indicator.
9For example, Batini et al. (2004), Linnemann and Schabert (2006), and Llosa and Tuesta (2008) all
conclude that domestic price ination targeting is preferable to consumer price ination targeting.
4specications that can help overcome the indeterminacy problem with domestic price in-
ation. We show that a domestic price ination policy that also responds either to the
real or nominal exchange rate, or to output, helps mitigate the problem of indeterminacy.
Indeed, we nd that indeterminacy is easily preventable under domestic price ination
provided each central bank also targets current output.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the two country
model. Section 3 presents the necessary and sucient conditions for real indeterminacy
under domestic and consumer price ination targeting. Section 4 investigates a number of
policy rules that can ameliorate the indeterminacy problem under domestic price ination.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a global economy that consists of two countries denoted home and foreign, where
an asterisk denotes foreign variables. Within each country there exists a representative
innitely-lived agent, a representative nal good producer, a continuum of intermedi-
ate good producing rms, and a monetary authority. The representative agent owns
all domestic intermediate good producing rms, and supplies labour and capital to the
production process. Intermediate rms operate under monopolistic competition and use
domestic labour and capital as inputs to produce tradeable goods, which are sold to the
home and foreign nal good producers. The labour and rental capital markets are both
assumed to be competitive. Each representative nal good producer is a competitive
rm that bundles domestic and imported intermediate goods into a non-tradeable nal
good, which is consumed and used for investment by the domestic agent. Preferences and
technologies are symmetric across the two countries. The following presents the features
of the model for the home country on the understanding that the foreign case can be
analogously derived.
52.1 Final Good Producers
The home nal good (Z) is produced by a competitive rm that uses ZH and ZF as inputs

















where the constant elasticity of substitution between aggregate home and foreign inter-
mediate goods is  > 0 and the relative share of domestic and imported intermediate
inputs used in the production process is 0:5 < a < 1.10 Thus 1 a captures the degree of
trade openness. The inputs ZH and ZF are dened as the quantity indices of domestic


















where the elasticity of substitution across domestic (foreign) intermediate goods is  > 1,
and zH(i) and zf(j) are the respective quantities of the domestic and imported type i
and j intermediate goods. Let pH(i) and pF(j) represent the respective prices of these
goods in home currency. Cost minimization in nal good production yields the aggregate




































10The analysis only considers this empirically relevant home bias case. See De Fiore and Liu (2005) and
Wang (2008) for further details.
6where P is the consumer price index and PH and PF are the respective price indices of














We assume that there are no costs to trade between the two countries and the law of one







where e is the nominal exchange rate. Letting Q = eP

P denote the real exchange rate,




























and hence the purchasing power parity condition is satised only in the absence of any
bias between home and foreign intermediate goods (i.e. a = 0:5). The relative price T,





2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate rms hire labour and rent capital to produce output given a (real) wage rate
wt and capital rental cost rrt. A rm of type i has a production technology:
yt(i) = Kt(i)Lt(i)1 ; (7)
where K and L represent capital and labour usage respectively, and the input share is
0 <  < 1. Given competitive prices of labour and capital, cost-minimization yields:


















7where mct  MCt
PH;t is real marginal cost.
Firms set prices according to Calvo (1983), where in each period there is a constant
probability 1   that a rm will be randomly selected to adjust its price, which is drawn
independently of past history. A domestic rm i, faced with changing its price at time t,
has to choose pH;t(i) to maximize its expected discounted value of prots, taking as given






















and the rm's discount factor is sXt;t+s = s[Uc(Ct+s)=Uc(Ct)][Pt=Pt+s].12 Firms that
are given the opportunity to change their price, at a particular time, all behave in an







The optimal price set by a domestic home rm e PH;t is a mark-up 
 1 over a weighted















Since all prices have the same probability of being changed, with a large number of rms,
the evolution of the price sub-indexes is given by
P
1 
H;t =  P
1 
H;t 1 + (1    )e P
1 
H;t ; (12)
since the law of large numbers implies that 1   is also the proportion of rms that adjust
their price each period.
11While the demand for a rm's good is aected by its pricing decision pH;t(i), each producer is small with
respect to the overall market.
12Under the assumption that all rms are owned by the representative agent, this implies that the rm's
discount factor is equivalent to the agent's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
82.3 Representative Agent
The representative agent is innitely lived with preferences over consumption C, domestic











where the discount factor is 0 <  < 1. For analytical simplicity we assume that the
period utility function is separable among its three arguments and the labour supply
elasticity is innite.
The representative agent owns the capital stock K and makes all investment decisions
I according to the law of motion
Kt+1 = (1   )Kt + It; (14)
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital. The representative agent carries
Mt 1 units of money and Bt nominal bonds into period t. Before proceeding to the goods
market, the agent visits the nancial market where a state contingent nominal bond Bt+1
can be purchased that pays one unit of domestic currency in period t+ 1 when a specic
state is realized at a period t price  t;t+1. Letting Rt denote the gross nominal yield on
a one-period discount bond, then in the absence of uncertainty, R
 1
t   t;t+1. During
period t the agent supplies labour and capital to the intermediate good producing rms,
receiving real income from wages wt, a rental return on capital rrt, nominal prots from
the ownership of domestic intermediate rms t and a lump-sum nominal transfer t
from the monetary authority. Hence the period budget constraint is given by




13To facilitate comparison with the existing literature, this paper adopts the traditional convention that end-
of-period money balances enter the utility function. This is equivalent to a cashless economy framework
provided the utility function is separable between consumption and real money balances. Assuming an
alternative timing-assumption on money would have important consequences for equilibrium determinacy,
as discussed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), Kurozumi (2006) and McKnight (2007a).

















Equation (16) is the consumption Euler equation for the holdings of domestic bonds,
which must hold for each possible state and the money demand equation is given by (19).
Equations (17) and (18) are the respective labour supply and optimal investment condi-
tions. Optimizing behavior implies that the budget constraint (15) holds with equality in
each period and the appropriate transversality condition is satised. Analogous conditions
apply to the foreign agent.
From the rst-order conditions for the home and foreign agent, the following risk-

















. Equation (20) is the standard uncovered interest
rate parity condition,14 and equation (21) is the risk sharing condition associated with
complete asset markets, which equates the real exchange rate Q with the marginal utilities
of consumption.
2.4 Monetary Authority
Monetary policy is specied as a Taylor rule in which the nominal interest rate is a
function of current ination. The monetary authority can adjust the nominal interest
14With the exception of Zanna (2003) the existing literature has analysed the issue of equilibrium deter-
minacy in open economy models where the uncovered interest parity condition (20) holds. While this
condition is rejected by empirical studies (e.g. see Lewis, 1995 and the references within), for analytical
tractability and comparative purposes we follow the existing literature.
10rate in response to changes in domestic price ination h
t or to changes in consumer price


















where R > 1 and   0.
2.5 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Market clearing for the home goods market requires
ZH;t + Z
H;t = Yt: (24)
Total home demand must equal the supply of the nal good,
Zt = Ct + It; (25)
and the labour, capital, money and bond markets all clear:
t = Mt   Mt 1 Bt + B
t = 0: (26)
Denition 1(Perfect Foresight Equilibrium): Given an initial allocation of Bt0, B
t0,
Kt0, K
t0, and Mt0 1, M
t0 1, a perfect foresight equilibrium is a set of sequences fCt, C
t ,
Mt, M
t , Lt, L
t, Kt, K
t , It, I
t , Bt, B
t , Rt, R
t, MCt, MC
t , wt, w
t, rrt, rr
t, Yt, Y 
t ,
et, Qt, Pt, P




t , ZH;t, ZF;t, Z
H;t, Z
F;tg for all
t  t0 characterized by: (i) the optimality conditions of the representative agent, (16) to
(19), and the capital accumulation equation (14); (ii) the intermediate rms' rst-order
conditions (8) and (9), price-setting rules, (11) and (12), and the aggregate version of the
production function (7); (iii) the nal good producer's optimality conditions, (2), and (4);
(iv) all markets clear, (24) to (26); (v) the representative agent's budget constraint (15) is
satised and the transversality conditions hold; (vi) the monetary policy rule is satised,
11(22) or (23); along with the foreign counterparts for (i)-(vi) and conditions (5), (6), (20)
and (21).
2.6 Local Equilibrium Dynamics
In order to analyse the equilibrium dynamics of the model, a rst-order Taylor approx-
imation is taken around the steady state. To be precise the model is linearized around
a symmetric steady state in which ination is zero ( =  = 1) and prices in the two






F). Then by denition the steady
state terms of trade and nominal and real exchange rates are T = e = Q = 1. In what
Table 1: Linearized system of equations
Cross-Country Dierences
b CR
t+1 = b CR
t +  b RR
t   b R
t+1 ISR
b RR




t = c mc
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 + b xR
t + 2(1   a)b Tt Marginal cost
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b Tt + 2 b KR
t Resource constraint
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t = (2a   1)b 
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t + 2(1   a)b et Ination
b Qt = 1
 b CR
t = (2a   1)b Tt RER
World Aggregates
b CW
t+1 = b CW
t +  b RW
t   b W
t+1 ISW
b W
t = c mc
W
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t Marginal cost
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t Taylor rule





































et 1. The parameters are dened as:  
(1  )(1  )
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(2a 1) + 1   










   (1   )
￿ 
 1   .
12follows, a variable b Xt denotes the percentage deviation of Xt with respect to its steady
state value X





In order to obtain analytical conditions for local determinacy we employ the Aoki
(1981) decomposition,15 which decomposes the model into two decoupled dynamic sys-
tems: the aggregate system that captures the properties of the closed world economy and
the dierence system that portrays the open economy dimension. Thus, we solve both for








terminacy of the aggregate and dierence systems implies determinacy at the individual
country level since b X = XW + X
R
2 and b X = XW   X
R
2 . The complete linearized system
of equations is summarized in Table 1.17 In what follows below it will also be convenient
to dene the labour-capital ratio xt  Lt
Kt.
Table 2: Baseline parameter values
 Discount factor 0:99
 Cost share of capital 0.36
 Depreciation rate of capital 0.025
  Degree of price rigidity 0.75
 Real marginal cost elasticity of ination 0.08
 Degree of monopolistic competition 7.66
In order to illustrate the conditions for determinacy, the ensuing analysis using the
following baseline parameter values summarized in Table 2. The parameters ,  and 
are taken from Sveen and Weinke (2005) and  from Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).18
As noted by Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) empirical estimates of nominal rigidity nd   to
be between 0:66 and 0:83. Following Taylor (1999) we set   = 0:75 which constitutes an
15The Aoki decomposition requires that the steady state is symmetric and both countries follow identical
policies.
16The determinacy conditions for the aggregate system are identical to comparable closed-economy New
Keynesian models (e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005)). The measure of ination targeted is irrelevant in








17The money demand equations are omitted since the remaining conditions determine local equilibrium
determinacy in the absence of real balance eects.
18As will be shown, the analytical results for determinacy do not depend on the parameters , which
measures the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption, or , which measures the elasticity of
substitution between aggregate home and foreign goods.
13average price duration of one year and this implies that the real marginal cost elasticity
of ination  = 0:08. However, the robustness of the numerical results are examined for
variations in  .
3 Policy Response to Current Ination
This section considers the issue of local determinacy for monetary policy rules that react
to contemporaneous ination. A key conclusion to arise from the analysis is that the con-
ditions for local determinacy under domestic and consumer price ination are no longer
equivalent in the presence of investment activity. Indeed, the criteria for equilibrium de-
terminacy suggest that targeting consumer price ination is preferable to domestic price
ination targeting. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the conditions for determi-
nacy of the aggregate system (or closed economy) is examined. Second, the determinacy
conditions of the dierence system are examined when monetary policy reacts to domestic
price ination. Finally, we consider the determinacy conditions of the dierence system
when consumer price ination is the price-index targeted.
3.1 Aggregate System
The set of linearized equations for the world aggregates, given in Table 1, can be reduced
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K +  C




7 7 7 7
5
:
Since the dynamics of mc, x, and  are independent of the capital stock dynamics, one
eigenvalue of the system is 1 + C
K > 1. Consequently, given that capital is the only
predetermined variable in the column vector bW, equilibrium determinacy requires that
two of the remaining eigenvalues of AW are outside the unit circle and one eigenvalue is
14inside the unit circle. The Appendix proves the following:
Proposition 1 If the policy rule reacts to contemporaneous ination, then the necessary
and sucient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy of the aggregate system is  > 1
and either







  1   (1   )





where 1 = 1   (1   ).
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
The determinacy conditions in Proposition 1 are isomorphic to the conditions obtained by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) for the closed economy.19 For the baseline parameter values,
(27) is violated only if    0:75. Thus if prices are suciently sticky, indeterminacy
can arise for some values of  > 1 provided condition (28) is violated. However the
region of indeterminacy is small. For example if   = 0:8 then indeterminacy arises
provided 1:1   < 1:71, whereas if   = 0:75 condition (28) is satised 8 > 1 and thus
indeterminacy is not possible.
3.2 Dierence System
3.2.1 Domestic Price Ination
If domestic price ination is the policy indicator, then the set of linearized conditions for
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K + 2(1   a)
i
>
1. For determinacy, two of the remaining eigenvalues of AR
PPI are required to lie outside
the unit circle and one eigenvalue is inside the unit circle.
Proposition 2 If the policy rule reacts to contemporaneous domestic price ination, then
the necessary and sucient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy of the dierence
system is  > 1 and either:







+ 3   (1 +  + 1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




where 1 = 1   (1   ) and 3 = (2a   1).
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
Proposition 2 suggests that the problem of indeterminacy can be more severe in the open
economy under a domestic price ination rule than compared to a closed economy. For
example, if conditions (28) and (30) are not satised then from direct comparison of
condition (29) of Proposition 2 with condition (27) of Proposition 1, determinacy in the











Fig. 1: Region of indeterminacy under a domestic price ination rule (  = 0:75)
16closed economy does not preclude determinacy in the open economy since:
(2   1)1 < [1   (1   )(1   (2a   1))] < [1   (1   )(1   )]:
The determinacy conditions in Proposition 2 are illustrated using the baseline parameter
values summarized in Table 2. Figure 1 depicts the regions in the parameter space (a, )
that are associated with determinacy and indeterminacy given   = 0:75. Recalling that
with these parameter constellations indeterminacy is not possible in the closed economy
(aggregate system) 8 > 1, it is apparent from Fig. 1 that the range of indeterminacy
is greater in the open economy relative to the closed economy. Figure 2 illustrates the
regions of indeterminacy for combinations of the ination response coecient () and the
degree of price rigidity ( ), for three alternative values of a = 0:7;0:8;0:9. The area of
indeterminacy for the dierence system is greater relative to the aggregate system and
this area increases in magnitude as the degree of trade openness increases (i.e. as the
value of a deceases). Consequently, we can conclude that under domestic price ination
the range of indeterminacy is greater in the open economy relative to the closed economy.
















a = 0.7 
a = 0.8 
a = 0.9 
closed  
economy 
Fig. 2: Regions of indeterminacy under a domestic price ination rule: variations in  
173.2.2 Consumer Price Ination
If consumer price ination is the policy indicator, then the set of linearized conditions for
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1   (2a   1) +
(1+J1)
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K + 2(1   a)
i
> 1.
Since there are now two predetermined variables b KR
t and b R
t 1, equilibrium determinacy
requires that two of the remaining eigenvalues of AR
CPI lie outside the unit circle and two
eigenvalues are inside the unit circle.
Proposition 3 If the policy rule reacts to contemporaneous consumer price ination,
then the necessary and sucient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy of the dif-
ference system is  > 1 and either:
 >











2(1   a)(1   ) +
3[   (1   1)]
1
  (1 + )





where 1 = 1   (1   ) and 3 = (2a   1).
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
Proposition 3 suggests that the indeterminacy problem is less severe in the open economy
if the policy rule targets consumer price ination rather than domestic price ination. For
example, if conditions (30) and (32) are not satised then this conclusion follows from
18direct comparison of condition (29) of Proposition 2 with condition (31) of Proposition 3:
(2   1)1 <  1 < 21(1   a) +  1;
where  1  [1   (1   )(1   (2a   1))]. Indeed, given the baseline values of ,  and
, the numerical analysis suggests that for any combination of the parameter triplets (a,
 , ) the open economy under consumer price ination targeting does not introduce any
additional areas of indeterminacy. To date, we have yet to nd a combination of para-
meter values that generate determinacy in the aggregate system without also generating
determinacy in the dierence system. Therefore, the numerical analysis suggests that the
determinacy conditions for closed and open economies are approximately analogous under
a consumer price ination rule.
3.3 Discussion
The previous subsections found that for parameter constellations consistent with equilib-
rium determinacy for a closed economy, preclude indeterminacy in open economies if the
policy rule reacts to consumer price ination. However, under a domestic price ination
rule the range of indeterminacy is greater in open economies relative to a closed economy.
These ndings are in stark contrast to recent studies that have considered the impact
of trade openness for equilibrium determinacy where production is assumed to be linear
in labour (i.e.  = 0). De Fiore and Liu (2005), Linnemann and Schabert (2006) and
Llosa and Tuesta (2008), using a small open economy framework, and McKnight (2007a)
using a two country setup, all nd that the Taylor Principle is validated under contem-
poraneous policy rules regardless of the magnitude of the degree of trade openness. Why
does the criteria for equilibrium determinacy dier for alternative measures of ination
with the inclusion of capital? First consider a labour-only economy. In a closed economy
an active monetary policy ( > 1) increases the real interest rate. From the aggregate
demand channel of monetary policy this reduces (real) marginal cost such that current
ination rises by less than expected ination via the Phillips curve. In an open economy
the consumer price ination rate depends on both the domestic price ination rate and
19the terms of trade:
b t = b h
t + (1   a)

b Tt   b Tt 1

; (33)
where b Tt 1 is predetermined. An increase in the real interest rate not only reduces domes-
tic price ination via a fall in marginal cost but in addition results in an improvement in
the terms of trade (b Tt #). From (33) this trade channel of monetary policy generates addi-
tional downward pressure on consumer price ination. Consequently for both closed and
open economies and for each ination target, self-fullling ination expectations cannot
be supported.
Now consider an economy with capital accumulation. Here the initial increase in in-
ationary expectations can be self-fullling if there is a further rise in expected ination.
This can occur since an increase in the real interest rate puts upward pressure on the
expected future rental price of capital (from the investment condition (18)). This leads to
an increase in expected future marginal cost and thus an additional rise in expected future
ination, which via the Phillips curve, generates higher ination today. Therefore, inde-
terminacy is generated if the eect of this cost channel of monetary policy is suciently
strong to counteract the downward pressure on ination arising from the aggregate de-
mand channel. In the open economy an increase in expected future ination also results in
a current deterioration in the terms of trade (b Tt "). This in turn puts upward pressure on
current real marginal cost, which is exacerbated as the degree of trade openness increases
and hence from the Phillips curve, upward pressure on domestic price ination. Conse-
quently, this cost channel can dominate the aggregate demand channel for a broader range
of parameter constellations in the open economy than the closed economy, thus making
a rise in domestic price ination self-fullling. However from (33) there are two opposing
eects on consumer price ination. While the cost channel generates upward pressure
in domestic price ination and the terms of trade (b Tt "), the trade channel of monetary
policy puts downward pressure on the terms of trade (b Tt #). Thus, since any increase in
domestic price ination can be oset by the trade channel of monetary policy, this reduces
the likelihood of indeterminacy if the policy rule reacts to consumer price ination.
204 Ameliorating the Indeterminacy Problem
In this section we consider three potential policy rules, advocated by Taylor (1993, 2001),
that can help mitigate the problem of indeterminacy under domestic price ination tar-
geting. First, we consider policy rules that respond to either the real or nominal exchange
rate, and then we consider a policy rule that responds to current output.
4.1 Policy Response to the Real Exchange Rate
Suppose the monetary authority reacts to both current domestic price ination and the
real exchange rate. In this case the linearized policy rule for the home country is given
by:
b Rt = b h
t + Q b Qt (34)
where Q > 0.20 Consequently, the set of linearized conditions for cross-country dier-
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K + 2(1   a)
i
>
1. For determinacy, two of the remaining eigenvalues of AR
PPI are required to lie outside
the unit circle and one eigenvalue must lie inside the unit circle.
Proposition 4 If the policy rule reacts to contemporaneous domestic price ination and
the real exchange, then for an active monetary stance ( > 1) the necessary and sucient
20For the foreign country's rule, the response coecient for the real exchange rate is the negative of that
for the home country.
21Note that the aggregate system presented in Section 3.1. is unchanged under (34). Hence, the determinacy
conditions of the aggregate system summarized in Proposition 1 are still appropriate.
21condition for local equilibrium determinacy of the dierence system requires either:







+ 3   (1 +  + 1)

+ (1   ) +  +
3
1







where 1 = 1   (1   ) and 3 = (2a   1).
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
Proposition 4 suggests that the indeterminacy problem associated with domestic ination
targeting can be mitigated if the policy rule also responds to the real exchange rate. For
example, provided conditions (30) and (36) are not satised, then this directly follows
from comparing condition (35) of Proposition 4 with condition (29) of Proposition 2:
(2 1)1 < [1   (1   )(1   (2a   1))] < [1   (1   )(1   (2a   1))]+2(2a 1)1Q:
The determinacy conditions summarized in Proposition 4 are illustrated using the baseline
parameter values for a degree of trade openness a = 0:7. Figure 3 illustrates the regions
of indeterminacy for combinations of the ination response coecient () and the degree

























Fig. 3: Regions of indeterminacy when reacting to the real exchange rate (a = 0:7)
22of price rigidity ( ) for three alternative values of the real exchange rate coecient Q =
0;0:1;0:2. If the monetary authority does not respond to the real exchange rate (Q = 0)
then the area of indeterminacy for the dierence system is substantially greater relative
to the aggregate system. However this area of indeterminacy signicantly decreases in
magnitude as the value of Q increases. Indeed for our baseline calibration, there are no
additional regions of indeterminacy in the open-economy for any    0:86 if Q = 0:3.
Why is the indeterminacy problem under domestic price ination targeting mitigated
if policy also reacts to the real exchange rate? Recall that indeterminacy is generated
in the presence of investment activity provided that the cost channel of monetary policy,
which puts upward pressure on ination, outweighs the downward pressure on ination
arising from the aggregate demand channel. From the linearized version of the risk shar-
ing condition (21), the real exchange rate moves in tandem with relative consumption:
b Qt = 1


b Ct   b C
t

. Hence by also reacting to the real exchange rate, an increase in
the real interest rate yields additional downward pressure on real marginal cost thereby
strengthening the aggregate demand channel and making self-fullling ination expecta-
tions less likely.
4.2 Policy Response to the Nominal Exchange Rate
Now suppose the monetary authority reacts to both current domestic price ination and
to changes in the nominal exchange rate. In this case the linearized policy rule for the
home country is given by:
b Rt = b h
t + eb et (37)
where e > 0.22 Under this policy specication the set of linearized conditions for cross-
country dierences yields a ve-dimensional system: bR
t+1 = AR
PPIbR













. One eigenvalue is outside the unit circle and another
is zero. Since there are two predetermined variables, b KR
t and b RR
t 1, equilibrium determi-
nacy requires that two of the remaining eigenvalues of AR
PPI lie outside the unit circle
and one eigenvalue must lie inside the unit circle. The determinacy analysis is carried
out using a numerical investigation for the baseline parameter values. Setting the degree
22For the foreign country's rule, the response coecient for the nominal exchange rate is the negative of
that for the home country.

























Fig. 4: Regions of indeterminacy when reacting to the nominal exchange rate (a = 0:7)
of trade openness a = 0:7, Fig. 4 illustrates the regions of indeterminacy for three alter-
native values of the nominal exchange rate coecient e = 0;0:05;0:1. By inspection of
Fig. 4, the regions of indeterminacy decrease signicantly as the value of e increases.
Indeed, for our baseline calibration there are no additional regions of indeterminacy in
the open-economy for any    0:86 if e = 0:18.
Why does reacting to the nominal exchange rate help induce equilibrium determinacy?
The inclusion of the nominal exchange rate in the policy rule in eect means a policy
response to the lagged interest rate and consequently currently-looking policy now also
responds to past domestic price ination. By using the linearized version of interest
parity condition (20), the policy rule (37) and its foreign equivalent, the Taylor rule for





t +2e b RR
t 1. Hence by reacting
to the nominal exchange rate this introduces policy inertia or interest-rate smoothing into
the dynamic system, which it is now well established from the closed-economy literature
that policy inertia helps in preventing equilibrium indeterminacy (e.g. Woodford, 2003;
Kurozumi and Zandweghe, 2008).
244.3 Policy Response to Current Output
Now suppose that the monetary authority reacts to both current domestic price ination
and current output. In this case the linearized policy rule for the home country is given
by:
b Rt = b h
t + yb Yt (38)
where ;y > 0. Under this policy specication the characteristic equations for both
the aggregate and dierence systems are fourth-order polynomials. Given the analytical
complexity in obtaining the necessary and sucient conditions for this case we alterna-
tively carry out a numerical investigation. We use the baseline parameter values given
in Table 2 and set the degree of trade openness a = 0:7. With (38) the capital stock
dynamics can no longer be decoupled from the rest of the system. Hence we need to set
values for the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption, , and the elasticity
of substitution between aggregate home and foreign goods, . We set  = 2 and  = 1
which are consistent with Gali et al. (2007) and Treer and Lai (1999) respectively.23
Figure 5 illustrates the regions of indeterminacy for combinations of the ination
response coecient () and the degree of price rigidity ( ) for two alternative values of
the output coecient y = 0;0:02. The top half of Fig. 5 illustrates the indeterminacy
regions for the closed economy and the bottom half illustrates the open economy case
when a = 0:7. By inspection of Fig. 5, the area of indeterminacy is relatively greater
in the open economy than the closed economy under (38). Furthermore, by responding
slightly to output when  > 1, substantially reduces the indeterminacy problem in both
economies. Indeed, with a very small response to output, the numerical analysis suggests
that indeterminacy can be eliminated 8 > 1 in both the closed and open economy.
For example, if   = 0:8 then indeterminacy is eliminated if y  0:013 for the closed
economy. For the open economy indeterminacy is eliminated if y  0:034 when a = 0:7;
y  0:027 when a = 0:8 and y  0:019 when a = 0:9. Thus indeterminacy is easily
preventable! All that is required is that the monetary authority targets output slightly
more aggressively than what would be needed for a closed economy.
23Note that the sensitivity analysis suggests that while changes in  and  generate dierent quantitative
results, the qualitative conclusions are the same.
































Fig. 5: Regions of indeterminacy when reacting to output: closed vs open economy
5 Conclusion
Using a two country, sticky-price model, this paper has examined the role of trade open-
ness in generating indeterminate equilibria when monetary policy is characterized by an
interest rate rule that can respond to either domestic or consumer price ination. Recent
studies have found that the determinacy conditions for closed and open economies are
analogous if the policy rule is contemporaneous. Only in the case of forecast-based policy
rules does the index of ination targeted appear to matter for equilibrium determinacy,
in which case domestic price ination is deemed to be preferable to consumer price in-
ation. However, the existing literature has ignored the role of capital and investment
spending. This paper has demonstrated that a policy rule that responds to domestic price
ination increases the potential range of indeterminacy in comparison to consumer price
ination. However, we have highlighted three prescriptions for the indeterminacy problem
under domestic price ination. By either responding to the real or nominal exchange rate,
or to current output, can help to prevent self-fullling ination expectations and hence
indeterminacy.
One empirically unappealing feature of our analysis is the absence of adjustment costs
to capital and investment. However, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) nd for a closed econ-
omy that adding capital adjustment costs quantitatively aects the range of indeterminacy
26only if these adjustments costs are unrealistically high. One potential area of future re-
search is to examine the impact of capital adjustment costs for equilibrium determinacy
in open economies to check the validity of the results presented here. In addition, this
paper has assumed throughout that both fundamental preferences and policy are iden-
tical in both countries. However, in a model without investment, Bullard and Schaling
(2009) consider the implications for local determinacy if the degree of trade openness
is asymmetric between the two countries. This study suggests that one topic of future
research is to examine the determinacy implications of policy rules when the steady state
is asymmetric between the two countries and/or employing a multi-country analysis.
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30A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For the coecient matrix A
W one eigenvalue is given by 1+ C
K > 1. The remaining three
eigenvalues are solutions to the cubic equation r3 + a2r2 + a1r + a0 = 0, where
























For determinacy two of these three eigenvalues must be outside the unit circle and one
eigenvalue must lie inside the unit circle. By Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003) this is
the case if and only if either of the following two cases are satised:
(Case 1): 1 + a2 + a1 + a0 < 0,  1 + a2   a1 + a0 > 0;
(Case 2): 1+a2+a1+a0 > 0,  1+a2 a1+a0 < 0, & ja2j > 3 or a2
0 a0a2+a1 1 > 0;
where 1 + a2 + a1 + a0 =
( 1)(1 )







By inspection, Case (1) is not obtainable since the second inequality is never satised.
The rst inequality of Case (2) requires  > 1, the second inequality is always satised
and the nal two inequalities yield (27) and (28) respectively.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
For the coecient matrix A
R




K + 2(1   a)
i
> 1.
The remaining three eigenvalues are solutions to the cubic equation r3+a2r2+a1r+a0 = 0,
where





























31For determinacy two of these three eigenvalues must be outside the unit circle and one
eigenvalue must lie inside the unit circle. By Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003) this is
the case if and only if either of the following two cases are satised:
(Case 1): 1 + a2 + a1 + a0 < 0,  1 + a2   a1 + a0 > 0;















By inspection, Case (1) is not obtainable since the second inequality is never satised.
The rst inequality of Case (2) requires  > 1, the second inequality is always satised
and the nal two inequalities yield (29) and (30) respectively.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
For the coecient matrix A
R




K + 2(1   a)
i
> 1
and another eigenvalue is zero. The remaining three eigenvalues are solutions to the cubic
equation r3 + a3r2 + a2r + a1 = 0, where
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For determinacy two of these three eigenvalues must be outside the unit circle and one
eigenvalue must lie inside the unit circle. By Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003) this is
the case if and only if either of the following two cases are satised:
(Case 1): 1 + a3 + a2 + a1 < 0,  1 + a3   a2 + a1 > 0;
















. By inspection, Case (1) is not obtainable since the second
inequality is never satised. The rst inequality of Case (2) requires  > 1, the second
inequality is always satised and the nal two inequalities yield (31) and (32) respectively.
32A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
For the coecient matrix A
R




K + 2(1   a)
i
> 1.
The remaining three eigenvalues are solutions to the cubic equation r3+a2r2+a1r+a0 = 0,
where
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For determinacy two of these three eigenvalues must be outside the unit circle and one
eigenvalue must lie inside the unit circle. By Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003) this is
the case if and only if either of the following two cases are satised:
(Case 1): 1 + a2 + a1 + a0 < 0,  1 + a2   a1 + a0 > 0;
(Case 2): 1+a2+a1+a0 > 0,  1+a2 a1+a0 < 0, & ja2j > 3 or a2
0 a0a2+a1 1 > 0;


















By inspection, Case (1) is not obtainable since the second inequality is never satised.
Assume  > 1, since otherwise the aggregate system would be indeterminate. Then the
rst two inequalities of Case (2) are always satised and the nal two inequalities yield
(35) and (36) respectively.
33